Server

ContextLattice

Published by sheawinkler. Transport: HTTPS (remote). Written in go.

Cross-source (2 sources)

View source on GitHub Scan status Methodology

Description

Description below is sourced from the LF AAIF MCP registry. MCPowered surfaces the publisher's own words; the publisher is the warrantor of any claims they make.

Private-by-default, local-first memory/context/task orchestrator for MCP apps and agents.

Provenance

Server id: github/sheawinkler/contextlattice
Repository: sheawinkler/contextlattice
Surfaced by: awesome-mcp-servers , LF AAIF registry
Category: Knowledge & Memory

Scan status

Code axis

70 / 100

Higher is fewer findings; see how the code axis is computed.

Last scanned 2026-05-28T14:14:37Z

Source hash f9a6981f2a56

Total findings 6 · 1 critical · 0 warning · 5 informational

Checks run Tool description scan , Tool output literal scan , Dependency CVE check , Permission audit

Findings

critical permission_audit methodology

bench/context_storage_ops_perf_tranche.py:32

Matched subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=root, shell=True

Suggested action The server has the shell-exec + network-out + fs-write trifecta. This combination enables data exfiltration via shell. Review the install scope before granting.

Patterns trifecta
informational permission_audit methodology

archive/scripts/inference_router.py:77

Matched subprocess.check_output

Suggested action The server spawns subprocesses. Review whether this matches the server's documented purpose.

Patterns subprocess
informational permission_audit methodology

bench/context_storage_ops_perf_tranche.py:32

Matched subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=root, shell=True

Suggested action The server uses shell execution. Prefer execFile/spawn with argument arrays over shell strings. See methodology.

Patterns shell-exec
informational permission_audit methodology

archive/bench/ane_sidecar_route_bench.py:169

Matched .write_text(

Suggested action The server writes to the filesystem. Verify the server documents which paths it touches.

Patterns fs-write
informational permission_audit methodology

archive/services/orchestrator_legacy_python/app.py:4933

Matched .read_text(

Suggested action The server reads from the filesystem. Verify the server documents which paths it accesses.

Patterns fs-read
informational permission_audit methodology

archive/scripts/inference_router.py:193

Matched httpx.post

Suggested action The server makes outbound network calls. Verify the documented destination list matches.

Patterns network-out

What we couldn't check

dynamic_tool_descriptions
Static analysis only sees descriptions hardcoded in source. Servers that compute descriptions at runtime (server-generated tools/list responses) are not covered by Check 1 at v0.
ast_indirection
v0 regex sees only literal description strings. Descriptions assembled by concatenation or pulled through variable indirection evade detection until AST-level extraction lands in v1.

Install configuration

Universal install-config generation across agent clients (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, ChatGPT Apps, Continue, Cline, Zed) is a v0 deliverable. For now, install per the publisher's repository instructions linked above. The auto-generated client-specific configuration block lands here when the install-config generator ships.

Disclaimer

Scan results describe what our static checks found and didn't find at the time of scan. They are not a recommendation, certification, or guarantee. A scanned-clean result is the absence of evidence of malice, not the presence of evidence of integrity. Servers can be compromised after scan. You are responsible for evaluating whether to install any MCP server. See our methodology for what we check, what we can't check, and the limits of static analysis.

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